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ARTICLE 
GOOD CASUISTRY AND BAD CASUISTRY: 
RESOLVING THE DILEMMAS FACED BY 
CATHOLIC JUDGES 
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA 
I. INTRODUCTION: DISTINGUISHING GOOD AND BAD CASUISTRY 
Casuistry is an intriguing word with two connected meanings that are 
opposite in their thrusts. The older, positive meaning is this: "the applica-
tion of general ethical principles to particular cases of conscience or con-
duct."l Casuistry in this sense is associated with moral and legal reasoning 
in the Catholic tradition through the Middle Ages. The newer, pejorative 
meaning of casuistry is this: "specious, deceptive, or oversubtle reasoning, 
especially in questions of morality."2 This meaning took hold after the Ref-
ormation, in the wake of Protestant criticisms that Catholic casuistic reason-
ing mainly served to justify bad conduct. 3 For simplicity, I will call these 
"good" and "bad" casuistry, respectively. 
Both senses of casuistry refer to moral and legal reasoning in connec-
tion with concrete situations, but good casuistry lauds this form of reason-
ing, while bad casuistry is skeptical of it. Although casuistry-in both 
senses-is identified with Catholicism for historical reasons, it is not lim-
ited to that particular religious tradition, but rather describes any approach 
to reasoning about moral principles which emphasizes resolving dilemmas 
in specific contexts of application. Owing to two problems set out immedi-
ately below, good casuistry in a religious context must always guard against 
degenerating into bad casuistry. 
The first problem is that novel and unanticipated situations are con-
stantly thrown up as society evolves in every way: political, cultural, eco-
nomic, technological, legal and so forth. Consequently, longstanding 
religious teachings and principles, developed in an earlier day, must on an 
1. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?r=2&q=casuistry (last visited 
Feb. 19,2007). 
2. [d. 
3. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilCasuistry (last visited 
Feb. 19. 2007). 
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ongoing basis be interpreted and extended to apply to circumstances that 
were unimagined when the principles were fIrst laid down, all the while 
maintaining the appearance of consistency. As we know from hotly dis-
puted contemporary disagreements about the meaning and application of 
provisions in the U.S. Constitution, applying two-century-old principles and 
rules to modem situations leaves many open questions, and much room to 
maneuver. The diffIculties are magnifIed when the principles being applied 
were laid down two thousand years ago. Under these circumstances, reason-
ing from teachings and principles requires imagination and subtlety. For 
anyone who aims to be true to the controlling teachings and principles, 
moreover, self-discipline is an essential trait because more than one out-
come frequently can be rationalized. 
The second problem is that people must live and undertake activities 
in, and earn their keep in, a society of intercourse that is often indifferent to 
religious teachings. Life is complicated. Church teachings and moral princi-
ples tend to operate at a level above the messy reality, requiring conformity 
to demanding dictates about good and bad behavior. When these moral dic-
tates appear to require an unpalatable sacrifIce, like giving up a lucrative or 
powerful trade, there will be a strong incentive to attempt to reconcile the 
contrary church teachings and moral principles with the prohibited activi-
ties. When such reconciliation is not easy to accomplish, the reasoning that 
justifIes continued participation in the offending activity will involve in-
creasingly subtle distinctions and arguments. Taken to an extreme, this ef-
fort may even come to justify conduct that at fIrst blush would appear to be 
directly at odds with the underlying teaching or church principle. 
These two problems interact: the openness entailed by the fIrst in-
creases the ease with which the temptation entailed in the second can be 
satisfIed. As a consequence, there is constant pressure on good casuistic 
reasoning to produce what has the appearance of bad casuistry. One and the 
same body of moral reasoning can be viewed as good casuistry or bad casu-
istry depending upon the perspective from which it is being adjudged. The 
people engaged in the reasoning may well be persuaded that it is right and 
convincing. When this selfsame reasoning is evaluated by persons not 
steeped in the assumptions or mindset of the reasoner, however, it can look 
specious and deceptive. Ironically, the former would proudly identify his or 
her fInished work as a fIne example of casuistry, while the latter would see 
it as evidence that casuistry involves exercises in rationalization that allow 
people to carry on the activities they desire without violating religious 
teachings or moral principles. 
A couple of mundane personal examples will help make this point and 
its implications more concrete. My neighborhood in Queens, New York 
City, has many Orthodox Jews. I am friendly with my neighbors, and have 
been called upon by them on several occasions on Sabbath to help with a 
problem. I am considered a neighborhood goy, and am proud of this role. 
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On one occasion, my neighbor asked me to come over to turn on her stove. 
She had an automatic timer that usually did the trick, but that day it was 
broken, and she needed to cook. She told me that she could use the stove 
and turn it off, but she was prohibited from turning it on. On another occa-
sion, I was asked to come into the temple to turn on the air conditioner (for 
the same reason). And on a number of occasions, I have been asked to push 
elevator buttons for Jews who wished to ride. 
I have no doubt that there are elaborate rationalizations that justify 
these activities, supported by a sophisticated body of religious commentary. 
And I respect the views of my Orthodox neighbors, which are no doubt 
sincere. 
To be frank, however, I'm skeptical. It strikes me as a subtle rationali-
zation to allow someone to use and turn off an air conditioner or stove, or 
ride an elevator, so long as he does not personally turn it on. From my 
outsider perspective, I assume that whatever traditional prescriptions they 
are following were set down before the invention of electric stoves, air con-
ditioners, and elevators. And I assume that they do not want to give up 
these modern conveniences-as I would not-and therefore have worked 
out ways to reconcile the uses of these devices with ancient religious 
teachings. 
These cursory observations will likely have plausibility with people 
outside the Orthodox tradition-and that is what I wanted to illustrate by 
invoking them. Just as I am not an Orthodox Jew, I am not a Catholic. Now 
let me turn to the Catholic context, and specifically to Professor Hartnett's 
paper. Professor Hartnett engages in careful and subtle reasoning about the 
ways judges should reason through moral dilemmas, but at times his analy-
sis strikes me in the same way as the activities of my Orthodox neighbors. 
Consider a couple of examples of casuistic reasoning he mentions. Al-
though the use of contraceptives is a sin according to Church teaching, one 
of the moral manuals he refers to says this: "Clerks in a drug store may 
never advise customers in the purchase of contraceptives, but to keep these 
positions they may sell these things to those who ask for them."4 Here is a 
related example: One may sell an item that can only be used in sin, so long 
as the seller disassociates his intention with that of the sinner, and "the 
purchaser can easily get the article elsewhere."s And a final example: Al-
though immoral dances and shows promote sin, the owner of the theatre, 
the staff, and the musicians can all work in connection with the shows, 
basically because these are income-generating positions and people need to 
make a living.6 
4. Edward A. Hartnett, Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 2, 
221 (2007). 
5. [d. at 253 (citing 1 HENRY DAVIS, MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 346 (L.W. Geddes 
ed., 8th ed. 1959) (1935». 
6. [d. at 252. 
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In each of these examples, the activity is sinful according to Church 
teaching and the person involved is in one way or another facilitating that 
activity. The activities involve everyday activities. They have an economic 
component. And giving up that activity will inflict a financial sacrifice. 
Casuistic reasoning allows participation in these sinful activities without 
violating church teachings and moral principles. 
Professor Hartnett can rightly protest that I have taken these positions 
out of context, and insist that they make sense when viewed in terms of the 
moral reasoning applied. Yes, and I also took the practices of my Orthodox 
neighbors out of context. But that is my point. Although I can follow the 
reasoning, from the standpoint of an outsider these look like rationalizations 
of activities to allow people to carry on in the modem world. What mem-
bers of the Church might consider good casuistry smacks of bad casuistry to 
others. 
These introductory comments about good and bad casuistry do not di-
rectly bear on or respond to Professor Hartnett's argument, which must be 
engaged on its merits. Rather, they suggest that there are prudential reasons 
to critically scrutinize casuistic reasoning to insure that it is not rationaliza-
tion in the guise of moral reasoning. The above examples involve relatively 
benign situations. But the same cannot be said when casuistic reasoning is 
invoked in legal contexts. The next Part will discuss, again in general terms, 
legal examples of casuistic reasoning in connection with the death penalty 
and divorce. The Part thereafter will specifically take up Professor Hart-
nett's argument on abortion bypass cases. Throughout this analysis I will 
challenge Professor Hartnett's argument from the standpoint of an outsider 
who is concerned about the implications of his casuistic reasoning for other 
affected parties and for the legal system. 
n. CASUISTRY IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT 
The legal system is a system of coercive public power. Literally, it 
inflicts pain, death, and restraint on human bodies; it can take money and 
possessions, as well as freedom; it grants and allocates powers and re-
sources, and requires conformity with its dictates. The judge occupies a 
pivotal position in this organized, coercive system. For this reason, when 
evaluating the implications of Catholic teachings and moral principles for 
judges, one cannot remain only within the internal Catholic perspective. 
To appreciate the stakes involved, consider an argument referred to by 
Professor Hartnett in connection with the death penalty. The death penalty 
was allowed in early Church teaching. When writing on the subject, Saint 
Thomas Aquinas held that a judge who knows that a person has been con-
victed by a false witness may nevertheless sentence that innocent person to 
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death, as long as the evidence supports the sentence.7 Aquinas offers this 
rationale for his position: the judge is merely applying the law, and the real 
sinner in this situation is the false witness. But what about a moral principle 
that lines up on the other side: knowingly ordering the death of an innocent 
person is wrong. Any reasoning that detracts from this fundamental pro-
position must be compelling. 
Aquinas' example is expanded upon by Father Slater, who asserts that 
it is not sinful for a judge to administer an unjust law. Here is Father 
Slater's reasoning: "A judge, who is merely the mouthpiece of the legislator 
and administers law ready made, may often co-operate in administering un-
just law, for otherwise he would have to resign his office."8 
There are two points I wish to make about these arguments. First, 
Aquinas' and Father Slater's argument accomplishes too much, and by im-
plication reveals a troubling looseness in casuistic reasoning. If the reason a 
judge does not engage in sin when knowingly sentencing an innocent per-
son to death or when applying an unjust law is that the judge is merely 
passively doing what the law requires, as both Aquinas and Father Slater 
suggest, then this reasoning would suffice in all cases to absolve the judge 
of moral responsibility for legal actions. If that is correct, there would be 
nothing further to discuss about this subject. The judge faces no moral di-
lemma-is always innocent of sin-in connection with any action that is 
compelled by the law. By using the conditional term "may often," Father 
Slater suggests that this argument won't always work to absolve a judge, 
but then we need to know when and why it will be insufficient, and we 
must keep in mind that Aquinas' example is a rather extreme one of 
injustice. 
The situation is complicated further because the above statements are 
at odds with a more famous position identified with Aquinas-the notion 
that unjust laws lack authority: "And laws of this sort ... are acts of vio-
lence rather than laws, as Augustine says, 'A law that is not just seems to be 
no law at all.'''9 If unjust laws are "a perversion of law," as Aquinas says, it 
is unclear how or why a judge can be absolved of sins when acting pursuant 
to such laws, which, lacking legal status, are not morally obligatory. My 
point is not to participate in this complicated debate. but rather to reveal the 
contestable and flexible style of casuistic reasoning. through which context 
specific rationalizations may lead to results that appear at odds with starting 
general principles. 
7. ld. at 243 n.94 (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part lJ of the Second 
Part, q. 64 n.6 (in Vol. 3 of Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classes 
1998)). 
8. Id. at 246 (citing 1 DAVIS, supra note 5, at 349). 
9. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGlAE, Part I of the Second Part, q. 96 a. 2 (in vol. of 
Hutchins ed., & trans., Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1952). 
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Second, a particular aspect of Father Slater's justification bears em-
phasis. He includes in his evaluation of the judge's conduct recognition of 
the fact that "otherwise he would have to resign his office." This adverse 
consequence suffered by the judge apparently counts as a factor in deter-
mining the morality of the action, although it is not clear how much weight 
it is given. If this weighs heavily-after all, enforcing an unjust law would 
appear to be a quite weighty consideration-then it appears that judges can 
often engage in official actions that would be considered wrongful from the 
standpoint of Church teaching or moral principles. 
There is another serious problem with this way of reasoning. A strong 
argument can be made that moral principles matter most when a person 
must give up something to conform to the principle. If one has no compul-
sion to be a child molester, then the moral impropriety of this act is irrele-
vant to one's behavior. Only people inclined toward pedophilia demonstrate 
their fealty to the moral prohibition of it when they abstain from acting on 
their compulsion. If the very fact that one must pay a price is a factor 
weighed in the evaluation of the propriety of the activity, as Father Slater's 
words suggest, then this aspect of morality is diminished. As I noted earlier, 
(bad) casuistry characteristically takes personal sacrifices of this kind into 
consideration when determining whether the activity will be allowed, which 
raises a legitimate suspicion about whether the primary goal driving the 
reasoning is to figure out the morally correct course of action or to find 
some rationalization that will allow it to continue. 
A few quick observations about divorce, also mentioned in Professor 
Hartnett's paper, will reinforce the points just made. Setting aside various 
nuances, divorce is a sin in Catholic teaching. But divorce is common in 
modem Western societies. Divorces are granted by a judge, and many 
judges handle divorce cases. If Catholics cannot participate in divorces, it 
would follow that Catholics will be precluded from holding judicial posi-
tions in many jurisdictions. Not surprisingly, the Church appears to take a 
pragmatic stance with respect to these cases, allowing judges to grant di-
vorces for "grave and proportionate reasons."IO 
This treatment of divorce appears to be at odds with Professor Hart-
nett's analysis about the distinction between formal and material coopera-
tion in sin, a distinction which is central to his analysis. 1 I Stated in the 
simplest terms, formal cooperation in sin involves participating in a sin with 
the intention to bring about its purpose, whereas material cooperation in sin 
involves participating in the sin but without intending it. Generally speak-
ing, one may not formally cooperate in sin, but material cooperation is per-
10. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 247 (citing Pope John Paul II, Address to the Roman Rota (Jan. 
28,2(02». 
11. [d. at 230--33. 
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missible under certain circumstances (primarily, when the good that follows 
outweighs the evil of the sin). 
Owing to the outcome determinative consequences attached to this dis-
tinction, the categorization of an act as "formal" or "material" cooperation 
is pivotal. Professor Hartnett, for example, laboriously argues that a judge 
who imposes a death penalty might nonetheless not intend that the penalty 
be imposed (for example, when proceeding to ask that clemency be granted 
to the condemned). Again note how casuistic reasoning can arrive at a 
counter intuitive result-that a judge who orders a death penalty does not 
intend it. In the absence of a plausible argument of this sort, judges who 
impose the death penalty will be formally cooperating in sin. It would fol-
low that Catholic judges will not be able to preside over these cases (assum-
ing the death penalty is prohibited under Catholic teaching, which is a 
disputed issue). This is arguably not a major problem because death penalty 
cases are relatively infrequent, but the same cannot be said of divorce. 
What makes divorce interesting is that it seems impossible to argue 
that a judge who grants a divorce order does not intend it. Imposing a death 
penalty does not in itself achieve the death, which is carried out by others, 
usually at a later date, and following many potentially intervening circum-
stances. An order granting a divorce, by contrast, is what is known as a 
performative act-the very granting of the order accomplishes its objective. 
By signing the divorce order, the judge literally ends the marriage; indeed, 
it usually cannot be terminated without a judge's signature. Thus, according 
to the criteria provided by Professor Hartnett, it would seem to necessarily 
follow that judges who grant divorces are formally cooperating in sin. 
Nonetheless, the Church's position appears to treat these situations as if 
judges are merely involved in material cooperation. My point is not to de-
bate the appropriate way to categorize divorce, but rather to point out, once 
again, the apparent flexibility of casuistic reasoning in situations that in-
volve a high cost for conformity. 
ITI. HARTNE'IT'S ARGUMENT ON ABORTION BYPASS CASES 
The foregoing arguments raise general concerns about casuistic rea-
soning. I will now specifically address Professor Hartnett's argument relat-
ing to judges who preside over cases in parental bypass situations. 
Ordinarily, minors must obtain parental consent to have an abortion. As 
Professor Hartnett describes,12 minors may petition a judge to allow them to 
obtain an abortion without such consent. 
Hartnett distinguishes and categorizes two types of decisions a judge is 
called upon to make pursuant to statutory bypass provisions. 13 One decision 
is whether the minor is mature enough to decide for herself; the second 
12. Id. at 249. 
13. Id. at 249-51. 
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decision, which takes place when the judge determines that the minor is not 
mature enough, is whether an abortion is in the best interest of the minor. 
When a judge decides that the minor is mature enough to make the decision 
without parental consent, Hartnett classifies the judge's cooperation as "ma-
terial." It is material because a judge who makes such a decision does not 
necessarily intend the abortion. Although the judge is aware that an abor-
tion will likely follow from the decision, the judge is merely granting that 
the minor is mature enough to make her own decision. In contrast, when a 
judge determines that the minor is not mature enough, and must therefore 
decide whether the abortion is in the minor's best interest, the cooperation 
in any afftrmative decisions is "formal." It is formal because a judge who 
rules in the afftrmative on this question will intend the abortion. Notwith-
standing these different categorizations, in both types of cases Professor 
Hartnett concludes that the judge must recuse herself. One can never engage 
in formal cooperation with sin, and one can engage in material cooperation 
only when the good that follows (under the notion of double effect) out-
weighs the evil, which he says is not the case in these situations. 
I will not question Professor Hartnett's respective categorizations. Nor 
will I question his analysis that Catholic judges should not participate in 
either of these situations. Instead I will focus on his analysis of the judge's 
proper course of action given those conclusions. 14 There are two options: 
resignation or recusal. Professor Hartnett argues that recusal is the appropri-
ate course. He reasons that these cases are relatively infrequent, so judges 
who recuse themselves will still be able to work effectively in their posi-
tions. Recusal is called for under judicial ethics rules when a judge cannot 
be impartial. Professor Hartnett suggests that Catholic judges opposed to 
abortion fall into this category (although he recognizes that recusal arguably 
does not apply to situations in which judges have moral qualms about the 
law). His bottom line is this: "From the perspective of moral theology, it 
would seem that resignation would only be called for if the cases were so 
frequent as to cause cumulative harm to the judge, such as hardening the 
heart." I 5 
Professor Hartnett's argument, I believe, exemplifies the dangers of 
casuistic reasoning. Note that it focuses primarily on the consequences to 
the Catholic judge-the risk to the judge of suffering personal harm. That is 
the standard orientation of casuistic reasoning, which analyzes the appropri-
ate course of conduct for an individual in morally fraught situations. As a 
consequence of this primary focus, other possible moral implications can be 
shunted to the background. In hi~ analysis, Professor Hartnett pays little 
attention to the consequences of the judge's recusal decision to other 
judges, to the minor, and for the law. A broader moral focus would pay full 
14. ld. at 257-58. 
15. ld. at 258. 
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attention to these other direct and collateral consequences of the decision, 
as I will briefly do below. 
When a judge recuses herself, a fellow judge must take up the case. No 
judge wants to handle these agonizing bypass cases. Many judges have 
moral qualms about abortions. When a bypass request is granted under ei-
ther alternative, the judge plays a determinative role in bringing about an 
abortion. Every judge understands that a pregnant minor has no good op-
tions and a difficult future. Tragedy will follow no matter which way the 
judge rules. Moreover, in most states, judges face some kind of election, 
and every judge knows that anti-abortion activists target judges on the issue 
of abortion. Judges who handle many of these cases thus put their positions 
at risk. 
To put the consequences in frank (and uncharitable) terms, a judge 
who recuses herself from these cases pushes off the sin and agony they 
bring onto other judges, and places their jobs in jeopardy. Catholic judges 
who follow Professor Hartnett's analysis will keep their hands clean, con-
sciences clear, and jobs secure, all at the expense of other judges. Now let's 
consider the other option: resignation. If a Catholic judge resigns, her posi-
tion can be filled by a judge who will not recuse herself. The sin and agony 
of these cases will be evenly distributed among all the judges; no particular 
judge can be inordinately targeted by anti-abortion activists because all par-
ticipate equally. 
What about the adverse consequences of recusal to minors and to the 
legal system? The course of action Professor Hartnett promotes is already 
taking place. An examination of these situations sheds light on the implica-
tions of his approach. In one local court in Tennessee, five out of nine 
judges refuse to sit on bypass cases, leaving the remaining four judges to 
hear all of them. 16 Judges in Alabama and Pennsylvania have also begun to 
recuse themselves. If more and more judges do this, as a practical matter it 
will become difficult for minors to exercise their legal right to obtain an 
abortion. If no judge in their area will hear the case, the minor may have to 
travel long distances to find a willing judge, but travel is especially difficult 
for minors (and given the situation, parents cannot be called upon to help). 
A desperate minor may even feel compelled to seek an underground abor-
tion, with obvious attendant dangers. In addition to exposing minors to 
harm and defeating their legal rights, mass recusals by judges undermine 
the integrity of the legal system by systematically restricting the application 
of a valid law. None of these consequences would follow if judges whose 
moral principles preclude them from participating in these types of cases 
resign and allow their positions to be filled by judges who are not so 
precluded. 
16. Adam Liptak, On Moral Grounds, Some Judges Are Opting out of Abortion Cases, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Sept. 4, 2005, at l.2l. 
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Anti-abortion advocates might well be pleased by mass recusals, 
which will likely reduce the number of abortions by minors. I will not argue 
against that here. Returning to Professor Hartnett's argument, my point is 
that imposing serious burdens on other judges, defeating the legal rights of 
minors and increasing the risks they face, and undermining a valid law, all 
raise serious moral considerations in their own right, which were not in-
cluded in his casuistic analysis of what Catholic judges should do in these 
cases. His focus was almost entirely on the moral implications for and harm 
to the individual Catholic judge. Beneath the surface, yet weighing in the 
balance, was the fact that resignation imposes a serious personal cost on 
Catholic judges, and would preclude Catholics from becoming judges in 
courts that handle these cases. If the overarching motivation is to discern 
the proper moral course of action in a difficult situation, then all of the 
moral implications surrounding the situation, including implications for 
others and for the legal system, must be fully considered in the evaluation. 
Otherwise the analysis will smack more of bad casuistry than good 
casuistry. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The forgoing analysis comes down too hard on Professor Hartnett, and 
on judges who decide to recuse themselves under these circumstances. The 
situation he addresses is exceedingly complex, and he approaches it with 
genuine integrity and an understanding of the dilemmas faced by the 
judges. There is no easy or clear answer to what they should do. If I have 
been overly harsh, it is not directed toward Professor Hartnett, but rather 
reflects my suspicions about casuistic analysis, the reasons for which I have 
elaborated. I will end with a few words about what I think is a good way to 
approach moral dilemmas. 
We face moral dilemmas all the time. Often we experience a dilemma 
not because the course charted by the applicable moral principles is unclear, 
but because for one reason or another we would prefer not to follow that 
course. The desire to do other than what the moral principle dictates is what 
creates the dilemma. It is natural under these circumstances to struggle to 
find some way to get around the moral principle, by finding an exception, 
striving to distinguish the situation, or reasoning to rationalize away the 
conflict. What drives this analysis is that we want to do what we want to do 
and yet feel that it's okay-that we are not behaving improperly when we 
go ahead. I speak from experience. 
There is another way to proceed when confronted with a moral di-
lemma. We can accept that there is a real conflict between what we want to 
do and what the moral principle requires. At that point we must choose. 
Painful and difficult as it is, we can forego the desired action, and accept 
that as the price to be paid for remaining true to the moral principle. Or, we 
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can engage in the desired action, and, painful and difficult as it is, recognize 
that we have done something morally wrong. 
Compare the difference in these two ways of dealing with a moral 
dilemma: engaging in an effort to rationalize versus facing up to the conflict 
and choosing. When one accepts that there is a conflict, whether one de-
cides to honor the principle or to engage in the activity, the person exper-
iences the painful and difficult consequences of the choice. When one 
attempts to rationalize, the primary difficulty is in struggling to come up 
with a convincing way to rationalize the desired activity with the apparently 
conflicting moral principle; once that is accomplished, the initial dilemma 
dissolves and the person proceeds to engage in the activity with a clear (or 
at least assuaged) conscience. Most people, under different circumstances 
and at different times, have utilized both of these ways of dealing with 
moral dilemmas. That does not, however, mean they are equally laudable. It 
seems evident, though I will not offer an argument to support it, that facing 
the conflict and making a choice has more to commend it from a moral 
standpoint than engaging in an effort to rationalize. 
The broader point of my argument in this essay is that Catholic judges 
faced with moral dilemmas, whether in death penalty cases or abortion 
cases or any other morally difficult situation, might be better served by 
accepting the conflict and making a choice rather than struggling to find a 
way to dissolve it. 
